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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION
Prama¯n.a Are Factive — A Response to Jonardon Ganeri
Matthew Dasti and Stephen H. Phillips
Department of Philosophy, Bridgewater State University
Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
Recently, Jonardan Ganeri reviewed the collaborative translation of the first chapter 
of Gan˙ges´a’s Tattvacinta¯man. i by Stephen H. Phillips and N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya 
(Ganeri 2007). The review is quite favorable, and we have no desire to dispute his 
kind words. Ganeri does, however, put forth an argument in opposition to a funda-
mental line of interpretation given by Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya about the 
nature of prama¯n.a, knowledge sources, as understood by Gan˙ges´a and, for that mat-
ter, Nya¯ya tradition. This response is meant to answer the argument and reassert an 
understanding of prama¯n.a as factive, that is, as knowledge sources that are inerrant. 
We argue that this is the best reading of Gan˙ges´a himself and of Nya¯ya tradition, and 
is defensible on purely philosophical grounds.
Ganeri summarizes Gan˙ges´a’s approach to epistemology as understood by Phil-
lips and Ramanuja Tatacharya under a few headings. Gan˙ges´a is a naturalist; that is, 
he seeks to understand prama¯n.a as “natural processes, part of the universe’s causal 
web” (Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004, p. 7; cited in Ganeri 2007, p. 350). 
He is furthermore a fallibilist about cognition. Cognitions may be true or false, ve-
ridical or non-veridical, and a cognition that an individual initially acts on as though 
veridical may be shown to be non-veridical later. Finally, Gan˙ges´a is an infallibilist 
about prama¯n.a: “no cognition that is produced by one of the attested sources of 
knowledge can be false” (Ganeri 2007, p. 350). This last notion troubles our critic. 
Ganeri asks “is the infallibilism on offer compatible with naturalism?” His answer is no:
Such a picture of the sources of knowledge seems to be at variance with a naturalist ac-
count, in which they are “natural processes” and “part of the universe’s causal web.” As 
natural organisms, we are certainly equipped with mechanisms and processes that put us 
in cognitive contact with the world we inhabit, processes which serve pretty well in a 
variety of circumstances, but are by no means infallible. (p. 351)
Philosophers who search for infallible sources of knowledge are led away from ordinary 
perception, inference and language” and instead towards “the natural light of reason” or 
“clear and distinct ideas” or “authorless Vedic revelation.” (p. 351)
If there are infallible natural causal processes that generate only true awarenesses, and if 
these processes can be typed in any significant way and so made subject to causal laws 
and generalizations, then they must be very different in character from ordinary percep-
tion, inference, and language. I doubt that there are any naturally infallible causal cogni-
tive processes; but even if there are, they will not be discovered by the philosophical 
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methods Gan˙ges´a employs in his work, nor will they have anything much to do with the 
sources of human knowledge he describes. (p. 353)
Claiming that there is incoherence in trying to understand prama¯n.a according to 
their operation within the natural world along with thinking of them as factive, Gane-
ri insists that one or the other must be jettisoned: either the naturalism or the infalli-
bilism must go. His preference is clear: get rid of the factivity requirement and keep 
the naturalism. He suggests further that classical Naiya¯yikas take this route, mention-
ing the Navya-Nya¯ya search for excellences (gun.a) and faults (dos.a) that impact
cognition-forming processes as well as a putative distinguishing on the part of some 
Naiya¯yikas, between correct and incorrect prama¯n.a (gun.a-ja and dos.a-ja prama¯n.a).
Ganeri also appeals to the work of other scholars such as Sibajiban Bhattacha-
ryya and Sukharanjan Saha. The latter is quoted: “We are of the opinion that prama¯n.a 
is to be understood here as only a truth-conducive and not as a truth-ensuring factor” 
(Saha 2003, p. 61; cited in Ganeri 2007, p. 352). Ganeri implies that Gan˙ges´a him-
self does not provide enough information to determine whether or not he embraces 
the factivity thesis, that is, that any genuine prama¯n.a must produce cognitions that 
are true. Therefore, the brunt of Ganeri’s case is his sense of the incompatibility of 
naturalism and infallibilism. He suggests that since the factivity requirement would 
be problematic philosophically, we should assume that such an astute and influential 
thinker as Gan˙ges´a would not make the mistake.
We have two points to make in response, the first meeting the philosophical 
challenge by arguing that the alleged incompatibility does not exist, the second mak-
ing a textual case. We shall close with some reflection about elements of Nya¯ya and 
Western epistemology that may have led to what we take to be Ganeri’s (and others’) 
misunderstanding of prama¯n.a in the views of Gan˙ges´a and Nya¯ya tradition.
1. There is no incompatibility between the conception of prama¯n.a as factive and 
Ganeri’s (or any version of ) naturalism, including Nya¯ya’s individuation of prama¯n.a 
as natural kinds (perceptionhood, inferencehood, and so on). Many biological and 
cognitive processes are what they are with respect to specific outcomes that are es-
sential. A specific outcome — “success” from an evaluative standpoint — is intrinsic to 
the process, a non-occurrence of which means that something other than the process 
proper has occurred. Sexual reproduction provides a good example. Although an act 
of sexual intercourse may fail to produce a child (indeed, it often does), this does not 
prevent us from conceiving of the outcome-inclusive “producing a child” as a natural 
process par excellence. In fact, it would be strange (and to our classical thinkers bi-
zarre) to think of the fundamental natural process “sexual reproduction” as having 
two sub-divisions: successful and non-successful child-production. One fails to 
understand the deep nature of the sexual act and of sexual organs without under-
standing their role in child-production. The successful function is the natural func-
tion, and is conceptually prior to failure, in that the latter presupposes that the former 
as a counterfeit copy presupposes the real McCoy. Without the former, the latter 
would be impossible, but not the reverse. Non-child-producing sexual intercourse 
may be understood as an abrogation — it only exists when childbirth fails to occur. 
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This does not entail that sexual intercourse always succeeds in producing a child, but 
if there is genuine sexual reproduction, then childbirth does occur. Similarly, as a 
prama¯n.a, perception (for example) invariably generates a true cognition, although 
there are aberrant processes, perception-like, that produce false cognitions.
The term prama¯n.a itself allows us to identify ideal cognitive processes. By defini-
tion, if a non-veridical cognition is produced, the producing process is not a prama¯n.a 
but an abrogation, regardless of phenomenal similarity between a false and a true 
cognition generated. Furthermore, Nya¯ya philosophers study knowledge-sources be-
cause our efforts to employ them allow us and everyone to answer questions, resolve 
doubts, and proceed in philosophy. Our attempts to employ knowledge-generative 
processes are not infallible. But that we sometimes mistake an inference-imitator, for 
example a hetv-a¯bha¯sa, a non-genuine inferential sign, for a legitimate prover (hetu) 
does not mean that the prama¯n.a inference is fallible. Similarly, in everyday English 
we say, “Well, I thought I knew. But it turned out that what I believed was false.” 
Knowledge is factive. The phrase “I know that, but I am wrong” is semantically 
erroneous. In Nya¯ya’s terms, it breaks the rule of yogyata¯, semantic “fittingness.” We 
do not use the word “knowledge” or its variants in regard to error; the word has a 
success grammar. Yet few people think of knowledge as an unnatural state. The same 
holds for prama¯n.a. “My cognition is prama¯n.a-produced, but it is false” is a precise 
parallel. A prama¯n.a produces a cognition whose objectivity (or intentionality) hits 
the mark. We do not have to be infallible judges of whether a prama¯n.a or a mere 
imitator has occurred. This is the key to Gan˙ges´a’s fallibilism as mentioned above. 
The factivity of a prama¯n.a is not, therefore, deployed by Nya¯ya as a magical bulwark 
against skepticism or in any other way that unjustifiably depends on the success 
grammar of the concept.
If anything, this aspect of Nya¯ya’s prama¯n.a theory is best captured by modern 
epistemological disjunctivism, the view that the mental states of knowledge and error 
are metaphysically distinct despite the possibility of exact phenomenal similarity 
between them. While Nya¯ya’s epistemology does not hold that prama¯n.a-produced 
cognitions may be fallacious, it does recognize that from the first-person perspective, 
the difference between knowledge and error may be imperceptible (especially in the 
absence of reflection). Moreover, Nya¯ya holds that the processes that generate knowl-
edge and error are similarly distinct despite phenomenal similarity.
2. The notion of the factivity of prama¯n.a is as old as the Nya¯ya-su¯tra itself and 
finds much support by thinkers of the early school. Su¯tra 1.1.4 famously states that a 
perceptual cognition (pratyaks.a) must be inerrant (avyabhica¯rı¯).1 Jayanta defines 
prama¯n.a as “the cause of a veridical cognition” (prama¯-karan.am prama¯n.am) and 
argues that qualifications like inerrancy, given in su¯tra 1.1.4, range over the defini-
tions of other prama¯n.a types:
It may be proposed that irregular producers of veridical cognition would be prama¯n.a. So 
to exclude producers of memory, doubt, and wrong cognition, three words from the Per-
ception Su¯tra (of the Nya¯ya-su¯tra, 1.1.4, perception being the first prama¯n.a defined), 
“caused by the object” (artha-utpannam), “inerrant” (avyabhica¯rı¯), and “determinate” 
(vyavasa¯ya¯tmakam), should be carried over (to the definitions of all the prama¯n.a). For they 
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apply in general to the set of four (perception, inference, analogy, and testimony). (Nya¯ya-
mañjarı¯) (Varadacharya 1969, p. 73)2
Another clear expression of this notion is found in the following passage from 
Va¯caspati’s Ta¯tparyat.ı¯ka¯. He is commenting on the term arthavat in Va¯tsya¯yana’s 
opening statement, “A prama¯n.a is arthavat since successful action follows from 
prama¯n.a-born cognition of an object” (prama¯n.ato ‘rtha-pratipattau pravr. tti-
sa¯marthya¯d arthavat prama¯n.am):
“A prama¯n.a is arthavat,” employs the possessive affix (vat) which indicates necessary link-
age (nitya-yoga). The condition of necessity (nityata¯) means non-deviation. The import is 
that a prama¯n.a does not deviate from its object. A prama¯n.a’s non-deviation amounts to 
the fact that there will never be a contradiction anywhere, anytime, in any other condi-
tions, between the nature of the object and the mode of presentation provided by the 
prama¯n.a. (Ta¯tparyat.ı¯ka¯ 1.1.1; Nya¯ya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1936–1944, p. 3)3
Va¯caspati’s understanding of prama¯n.a as factive is complemented by the distinction 
between prama¯n.a and prama¯n.a-a¯bha¯sa (semblance of a prama¯n.a). Uddyotakara 
(Nya¯ya-va¯rtika 1.1.1; Nya¯ya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1936–1944, pp. 7–8) speaks 
of prama¯n.a as prompting apprehension of an object (artha-paricchedaka). He further 
notes that a second thing, an imposter of a prama¯n.a (prama¯n.a-pratiru¯pa), is possible. 
This imposter, called prama¯n.a-a¯bha¯sa, is distinguished from the real thing in that the 
former is arthavat and the latter anarthaka (useless), being spoken of under the head-
ing prama¯n.a only in a figurative sense. Va¯tsya¯yana illustrates this distinction in a 
discussion of inference (Nya¯ya-bha¯s.ya 2.1.38; Nya¯ya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 
1936–1944, p. 516): “It is not the case that there is an inference that deviates. Rather, 
there has been no inference at all — this is erroneously considered an inference.”4
The preceding suffices to illustrate the view of prama¯na factivity held by leading 
thinkers of pra¯cı¯na-nya¯ya. Our reading of Gan˙ges´a is that given the traditional view 
of the matter, such factivity is presupposed by him. Indeed, it is thematic and organi-
zational for the Tattvacinta¯man. i as a whole (each of the chapters taking up in turn 
one prama¯n.a, in the traditional order — perception, inference, analogy, and testi-
mony). Still, there are occasions where Gan˙ges´a is explicit:
And such veridical cognition (prama¯) occurs in four varieties, in that the perceptual, the 
inferential, the analogical, and the verbal are distinct. In this way, there are proximate 
instrumental causes for the four — i.e., “means to veridical cognition,” prama¯n.a — in four 
varieties, in that perception, inference, analogy, and testimony are distinct. (translation in 
Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya 2004, p. 327)
We suggest that the burden of proof is on those who challenge the interpretation 
above to produce passages from traditional texts that speak of prama¯n.a as producing 
aprama¯, as such would be required if prama¯n.a are merely truth-conducive and not 
factive.
The only evidence that Ganeri gives is usage by later Nya¯ya philosophers of the 
terms gun.a-ja prama¯n.a (prama¯n.a born of excellences) and dos.a-ja prama¯n.a (prama¯n.a 
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born of faults). No actual bits of text are cited, but we hazard that among post-
Gan˙ges´a Naiya¯yikas awareness of Gettier-like problems of accidentally true cogni-
tion was common; for example, “There is fire on the mountain,” cognized on the 
basis of dust mistaken for smoke with respect to a mountain where there really is fire 
(unconnected to the haphazard line of dust that leads our subject to have the true 
cognition by means of the pseudo-inference). Any accidentally true cognition will 
have a prama¯n.a, a unique sequence of causal occurrences, in however bizarre a 
configuration, that can be said to have generated the cognition that is true. But this 
would not be a prama¯n.a as a general type, and it is the types, the invariable laws of 
knowledge production, that Nya¯ya philosophers are interested in. Many details about 
the operation of these natural processes are unknown to us (e.g., what is happening 
at the atomic level in sense-organ / object connection), but we can recognize these 
processes by various indications (called gun.a) and deviations from them by other 
indications (called dos.a), as well as by success, or failure, in action. And by seeing 
prama¯n.a as ja¯ti, as “natural kinds,” we are able to distinguish a process that just hap-
pens to generate one time a true cognition, a prama¯n.a in a broad sense and strictly a 
dos.a-ja prama¯n.a, from veritable prama¯n.a that operate with all persons and invariably 
generate knowledge.
Finally, we would like to suggest three factors that may contribute to Ganeri’s 
(and others’, including Saha’s) confusion about the factivity of prama¯n.a. First, a virtue 
of much recent study of Indian philosophy is that it is carried out by persons trained 
in contemporary philosophy. Such training fosters sensitivity for conceptual connec-
tions that are sometimes difficult to specify. A potential danger that philosophers 
face, however, is to read various contemporary positions into the classical thinkers. 
As Ganeri notes in his review, Phillips has often mentioned this concern and has 
criticized some instances of recent scholarship on this account (including his own). 
It seems to us that Ganeri rightly appreciates the deep similarities between contem-
porary reliabilism and prama¯n.a theory, but reads too much of reliabilism into prama¯n.a 
theory. Most relevantly, he reads into it the non-factivity of methods of knowledge, as 
reliabilism holds that our best epistemic methods are fallible but are on the whole 
reliable. To such a conception, the notion of factive prama¯n.a seems strange. Nya¯ya 
epistemology has much in common with contemporary reliabilism. But there are 
limits to the similarity. Reliabilism is concerned with determining the reliability of a 
method of knowledge. Nya¯ya is concerned with distinguishing between genuine 
prama¯n.a and pseudo-prama¯n.a. The approaches to process identification differ 
 radically.
Second, Nya¯ya endorses a procedure that has a lot in common with statistical 
review of a cognitive method in order to gauge its legitimacy. This is a standard relia-
bilist approach, an argument by appeal to track record. Jayanta, for example, suggests 
that an individual’s veracity and authoritativeness may be judged in the light of her 
history of assertion-making. He further claims that the authority of the Veda may be 
established by such an appeal. But it must be understood that such a review would 
not be done, by Nya¯ya’s lights, in support of prama¯n.a types such as perception, infer-
ence, or testimony, whose inerrancy is a conceptual truth. Rather, such a review 
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would be undertaken to establish (for example) whether or not an individual’s 
assertions are in fact instances of the prama¯n.a testimony and not merely s´abda-
a¯bha¯sa.
Third, Nya¯ya often seems to approach justification in an internalist way since so 
much philosophy is taken to be in dispute and requires the self-conscious employ-
ment of inference in particular. But the prama¯n.a, and their ability to produce knowl-
edge, require no such reflection in the absence of challenge or reasons for doubt.
Notes
1  –  indriya-artha-sannikars.a-utpannam˙ jña¯nam avyapades´yam avyabhica¯rı¯ vyava-
sa¯ya¯tmakam˙ pratyaks.am.
2  –  as´uddha-pramiti-vidha¯yinas tu pra¯ma¯n.yam prasajyata iti smr.ti-sam˙s´aya-viparyaya-
janaka-vyavaccheda¯ya pratyaks.a-su¯tra¯t artha-utpannam iti avyabhica¯rı¯ iti vyava-
sa¯ya¯tmakam iti ca pada-trayam a¯kr.s.yate tad hi prama¯n.a-catus.t.aya-sa¯dha¯ran.am.
3  –  tatha¯ hi prama¯n.am arthavad iti, nitya-yoge matup. nityata¯ ca avyabhica¯rita¯.
tena artha-avyabhica¯rı¯ ity arthah.. iyam eva ca artha-avyabhica¯rita¯ prama¯n.asya, 
yad-des´a-ka¯la-antara-avastha¯-antara-avisam˙va¯do ‘rtha-svaru¯pa-praka¯rayos tad-
upadars´itayoh..
4  –  na ayam anuma¯na-vyabhica¯rah., ananuma¯ne tu khalv ayam anuma¯na-abhima¯nah..
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